The concept of ‘causal powers’ as principles of necessary change, once derided by mainstream philosophers in the thrall of David Hume, has made a dramatic comeback and seems to be here to stay. The...

William of Malmesbury's Regesta Regum Anglorum is one of the great histories of England, and one of the most important historical works of the European Middle Ages. Although its focus is national, its scope encompasses most of Western Europe and beyond, providing a full-scale account of the First Crusade. Apart from its formidable learning, it is characterized by narrative skill and entertainment value - with topics including unpowered flight and Henry I's zoo. This edition in the Oxford Medieval Texts series (...) is the first modern translation and edition. A full historical introduction is supplied in Volume II. (shrink)

Logic ought to guide our thinking. It is better, more rational, more intelligent to think logically than to think illogically. Illogical thought leads to bad judgment and error. In any case, if logic had no role to play as a guide to thought, why should we bother with it?The somewhat naïve opinions of the previous paragraph are subject to attack from many sides. It may be objected that an activity does not count as thinking at all unless it is at (...) least minimally logical, so logic is constitutive of thought rather than a guide to it. Or it may be objected that whereas logic describes a system of timeless relations between propositions, thinking is a dynamic process involving revisions, and so could not use a merely static guide. Or again the objection may be that there is no such thing as logic, only a whole variety of different logics, not all of which could possibly be good guides. (shrink)

An important moral problem of the sort that confronts us in real life serves as the recapitulation of the main themes of the book. This is the question of race.

Analyses the interaction between principles and decisions in moral deliberation as well as in education. Hare gives three reasons for our inevitable employment of principles, and argues that principles ultimately arise from decisions. Thus, a complete justification of a decision to act can never be given in terms of principles alone but requires the justification of these principles in terms of their effects, which can only be provided in terms of a decision to accept the way of life the principles (...) are a part of. To make a value‐judgement is equally to make such a decision of principle. (shrink)

Hare first argues that his theory applies equally to instrumental and intrinsic goodness. He then goes on to show that his theory also holds for ‘good’ in both the non‐moral and moral context. People are falsely led to believe that ‘good’ is used differently in these contexts, Hare claims, because its descriptive meaning differs. Its evaluative meaning, however, is the same: in the moral context ‘good’ is always used to directly or indirectly commend people or human characters.

Hare argues that one exception to the rule that no imperative conclusion can validly be drawn from premises that do not contain at least one imperative are ‘hypothetical imperatives’ because their content, though of an imperative, is that of a statement implicit in the premises. He then argues that no ethical theory can be a ‘Cartesian’ moral system, i.e. consist of particular duties derived from self‐evident principles alone. Finally, three arguments are given why description can never be prescription, and thus (...) that no imperative can be inferred from indicative alone. (shrink)

Revisits the question of the relation between ethics, considered as a study of the logical character of moral concepts, and substantive moral questions. It covers much of the ground of previous chapters in an attempt to forestall confusion and clarify the theses embraced in the course of the book. The naturalist theory of ethics is contrasted at length with the thesis on moral argument outlined in this book.

Hare presents his own position, a theory that incorporates all the truths of the other theories that have been discussed, together with ‘prescriptive logic’, which is what makes rationality in moral thinking possible. Hare calls this position ‘universal prescriptivism’, and he identifies it as an adaptation of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Universal Prescriptivism gives a completely formal account of the meanings of moral words such as ‘ought’; i.e. it defines them purely on the basis of their logical properties. Of the theories (...) considered, this is the only one that satisfies all six of the requirements for an adequate ethical theory, and it also guarantees universalizability. Prescriptivity and, in particular, universal prescriptivity, enables us to examine moral intuitions objectively; furthermore, because the prescriptivity of moral statements is culturally invariant, it allows us to avoid relativism. (shrink)

Sets out a short history of proper names, those paradigms of referring expressions. The starting point is Mill, and the history is traced through Frege, Russell, Kripke, and McDowell. In the final section, the theory to be defended in the book is briefly stated.

Starts by showing that semantic complexity is not as such a barrier to being a referring expression, using the example of compound names. Goes on to consider whether definite descriptions, at least in some uses, should be counted as referring expressions and concludes that they should be, even if one endorses Russellian truth conditions for sentences containing definite descriptions.

Sets out the framework within which Reference without referents theory is developed. Truth theoretic semantics, though it certainly cannot tell us everything we wish to know, is accorded a significant role; the impact of the idea of a Russellian proposition is noted and deplored, negative free logic is described and endorsed, a methodology of maximizing ontological conservatism is stated, and the notion of rigidity is explained and shown to be intuitively consistent with lack of a referent.

Ugo Spirito (1896–1979) was a philosopher who changed his mind, repeatedly and sometimes radically, about many of his major commitments. At different times he called himself a fascist and a communi...

The paper evaluates Hume's alleged projectivism about causation and moral values.

First published in 1953, this seminal introduction to political philosophy is intended for both the student of political theory and for the general reader. After an introduction which explains the nature and purpose of philosophy, Dr Murray provides a critical examination of the principle theories advanced by political philosophers from Plato to Marx, paying special attention to contemporary issues. The book also makes an attempt to define the essential issues of philosophical significance in contemporary politics, with special reference to the (...) conflict between political authority and individual rights, and to show how the different moral assumptions underlying authoritarian and democratic systems of government are ultimately based upon different theories of logic. (shrink)

First Published in 1979. Paperback 1985. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informal company. This is an overview of Russell's philosophy, focussing in particular on his earlier work. Carter headings: Meaning; Names; Descriptions; The Perfect Language; Knowledge; Ontology; Mathematics.